University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 24
Number 1 Summer, 1993

Article 14

1993

Recent Developments: Darby v. Cisneros: Courts
Are Not Free to Require Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies before Seeking Judicial
Review if It Is Not Mandated by Either the
Enabling Statute or Agency Rules
Laura J. Mann

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mann, Laura J. (1993) "Recent Developments: Darby v. Cisneros: Courts Are Not Free to Require Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies before Seeking Judicial Review if It Is Not Mandated by Either the Enabling Statute or Agency Rules," University of Baltimore
Law Forum: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol24/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
on the theory that race is a "suspect
classification," such strikes are subject to "strict scrutiny." Id Therefore, since gender is a "suspect classification" under Maryland law, the
court permitted Batson's requirement
of strict scrutiny to be extended to
strikes based upon gender. Id
Finally, in applying its analysis to
the case at bar, the court concluded
that the trial court had erred by denying defense counsel the opportunity to
litigate the use of peremptory strikes
on the basis of gender. Id at 270, 623
A.2d at 653. The court also ruled that

Darby v. Cisneros

COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO
REQUIRE EXHA USTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BEFORE SEEKING JUDICIAL
REVIEW IF IT IS NOT MANDATED BY EITHER THE
ENABLING STATUTE OR
AGENCY RULES.

the prosecutor should not be permitted to attempt to propound a genderneutral explanation in any later proceeding. This peremption is based on
the fact that the prosecution freely
admitted, in the first trial, to exercising peremptory challenges to exclude
women from the jury. Id at 271,623
A.2d at 653. The court remanded to
the case to the circuit court for a new
trial.
In Tyler v. State, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland expanded the
Supreme Court's ruling in Batson v.
Kentucky. The court re-examined the

Batson framework and found that
under Articles 24 and 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the prosecution cannot peremptorily challenge
jurors on the basis of gender. Although the decision strips the prosecution of broad discretion in jury
selection, it heightens the State's accountability to the defendant. Moreover, it encourages both women and
men to serve on juries by discouraging the use of traditional stereotypes
about female and male jurors.

The Supreme Court of the United
States resolved a conflict between the
judicially created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
the statutory requirements of section
lO(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in Darby v.
Cisneros, _ U.S. _, 113 S.Ct. 2539
(1993). The Court held that when the
AP A applies, courts are not free to
require exhaustion as a rule ofjudicial
administration where the agency action has already become final under
section I o( c).
Petitioner, R. Gordon Darby
("Darby") was a South Carolina real
estate developer who developed and
managed multi-family rental projects.
Darby worked with a mortgage
banker, Lonnie Garvin, who developed a plan to permit multi-family
developers to obtain single-family
mortgage insurance from the respondent, the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD").
Garvin's plan allowed Darby to avoid
HUD's "Rule of Seven" which prevented rental properties from receiving single family mortgage insurance
if the mortgagor already had financial
interests in seven or more similar rental
properties in the same project or subdivision.
Darby obtained the financing for
three separate multi-unit projects and
although he successfully rented the
units, a combination of factors forced
him to default. As a result, HUD

acquired responsibility for the payment of over $6.6 million in insurance
claims.
In June of 1989, HUD issued a
limited denial of participation prohibiting petitioners from taking part in
any program in South Carolina administered by respondent, Assistant
Secretary of Housing, for one year.
During a hearing on the consolidated
appeals, an Administrative Law Judge
issued an "Initial Decision and Order" and found good cause to debar
petitioners for a period of eighteen
months.
Neither petitioner nor respondent
sought further administrative review
although they were entitled to request
a review by the Secretary according
to 24 C.F.R. § 24.314(c) (1992).
Instead, petitioners filed suit in the
United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina seeking an
injunction or declaration that the administrative sanctions were imposed
for purposes of punishment in violation ofHUD's own debarment regulations. The respondents moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district
court denied respondents' motion to
dismiss reasoning that the administrative remedy was inadequate. In a
su bsequent opinion, the court granted
petitioners' motion for summary
judgement.
On appeal by the respondents,

-Kelly A. Casper

the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed. Darby v. Kemp,
957 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1992). The
court concluded that there was no
evidence to suggest that further review would have been ineffective or
that the Secretary would have abused
his discretion by indetenninately extending the fifteen day time limitation
for review. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari after the Fourth
Circuit denied petitioners' petition for
rehearing.
The Court began its review by
analyzing the plain language of the
APA,5 U.S.c. § 704. Section lO(c)
provides that judicial review is available for final agency action when
there is no other adequate remedy in a
court, and that preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action ... is subject to review on the
review of the final agency action
. . .. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency
action otherwise final is final for
the purposes of this section
whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for
any form of reconsideration or,
unless the agency otherwise requires
by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 5
V.S.c. §704.
It was this text of the AP A itself
that the Court used as the foundation
for its opinion. The Court gave deference to Congress' power to establish
the basic rules under which a claim
may be heard in a federal court and to
fashion those exhaustion principles in
a manner compatible with congressional intent. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. at
2543 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan,
112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992». Section
I O(c) ofthe AP A codifies the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Under section 10(c), "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statue, is
entitled to judicial review thereof."
Jd. at 2544 (quoting 5 U.S.c. § 702).
Section I O(c) then establishes the standards for the availability of review

and limits the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies to that which the statute or
rule clearly mandates. ld. at 2545.
The Court concluded that it would be
inconsistent to require the litigants to
exhaust optional appeals when the
plain language of section lO(c) explicitly requires exhaustion only when
mandated by statutory or agency rule.
Jd.
Legislative history supports this
position as well. In a letter written to
the Judiciary Committee from Attorney General Tom C. Clark, dated
October 19, 1945, Clark maintained
that section lO(c) was intended to set
forthexistinglaw.ld. at4682. While
the law at the time allowed federal
courts to require exhaustion as a prerequisite to review, the Court noted
that those cases preceded the enactment of the APA. Jd. The pre-APA
cases stated that until an administrative appeal was taken, the agency
action was unreviewable because it
was not yet final. The decision was
not final because at that time, administrative agencies did not authorize
hearing officers to make final agency
decisions prior to the enactment of the
APA. ld. at 4683.
The dicta in pre-AP A cases concerning section I O(c) also reinforces
the Court's holding. In Vandalia R.
Co. v. Public Service Comm 'n, 242

U.S. 255 (1916), the Court held that
state law provided only that the Railroad Commission had the authority to
grant a rehearing but did not require
that rehearing be requested. ld. at
4682. In another pre-AP A case the
Court stated that it was not necessary
for the defendant to apply to the Commission for a rehearing before resorting to the court because the law does
not require such an application be
made, and granting a rehearing is
entirely within the discretion of the
Commission. Therefore, there was
no basis for making the application to
the Commission a prerequisite to judicial review. ld. (citing Prendergast
v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S.
43 (1923».
As a result of Darby v. Cisneros,
the Supreme Court settled a conflict
among the courts of appeals and defined the boundaries of the Administrative Procedure Act and the judicially created doctrine of exhaustion.
Darby v. Cisneros strengthens the
AP A by forcing the courts to adhere
to the plain language of section 1O(c)
rather than fonnulating contradictory
policies. The decision, however, also
allows any petitioner to ignore the
convenient, efficient, and less costly
administrative review process by seekingj udicial review in ou r overcrowded
judicial system.
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